Lindaman sentencing delayed so judge can consider motions

By Bob Steenson, bsteenson@charlescitypress.com

The scheduled sentencing of Douglas Lindaman on a conviction of assault to commit sexual abuse was delayed last week so that the judge in the case can consider several motions filed by the defendant, including motions that he not be sentenced to any prison time.

The sentencing had been set for Friday but now will be June 22.

Lindaman was convicted on April 18 when a Cerro Gordo County jury found him guilty of the aggravated misdemeanor charge of assault to commit sexual abuse, a lesser charge than felony sexual abuse in the third degree with which Lindaman had been originally charged.

Many of the motions Lindaman has personally filed since his conviction deal with topics he has raised before or during each of his three trials on the charge.

Lindaman was convicted of sexual abuse in the third degree in 2016 for having sexually touched the genitals of a 17-year-old boy when the boy was working on Lindaman’s farm in 2011.

He was sentenced to up to 10 years in state prison on that charge, but the conviction was overturned last year by the Iowa Supreme Court, which ruled that the Floyd County District Court had not thoroughly ensured that Lindaman made an informed decision when he decided to represent himself at that trial.

A second trial earlier this year ended in a mistrial after two witnesses made mention of the word prison regarding Lindaman. Lindaman’s previous criminal history, including a conviction on two felony counts of lascivious acts with a child in 1988, were ruled off limits to be mentioned before the jury.

The possible sentence for conviction of assault to commit sexual abuse is up to two years in prison, but Lindaman is arguing that he has already served 420 days in county jail or state prison, plus additional credit for time served under Iowa law, so he should not be given any more prison time.

Lindaman asks the judge to consider the lapse of seven years since the incident took place, lack of physical harm to the teenager, and Lindaman’s age, 62, in deciding no prison time should be given.

He also argues that he should not be required to register on the Iowa sexual offender registry, or receive the special sentence called for under Iowa law that would treat him as if he were on parole for 10 years, so that if he committed any violations of the terms of the “parole” he could be sent to prison.

Lindaman also says consideration should be given to his advancement of state law through the trial, including new forms of instructions to the jury and the ability to test jurors for bias through a written questionnaire.

And Lindaman again raises the point that he was charged with the crime just 10 days before a vote in the 2015 Charles City school board election in which he was running for a seat.

Lindaman has accused County Attorney Rachel Ginbey on multiple occasions of timing the charge to hurt his chances of winning election to the school board, but Judge Gregg Rosenbladt has ruled previously that the timing of the charges is irrelevant as far as the jury was concerned, and has nothing to do with whether he was guilty or not guilty of the charges filed.

Lindaman also again asks the judge to set aside the jury’s verdict, making several arguments about how evidence or testimony was treated during the trial or about the instructions given to the jury.

And Lindaman asks that witnesses be subpoenaed for a hearing on his motions, including a director at the Newton Correctional Facility where Lindaman was serving his sentence after the first trial before the conviction was overturned.

Lindaman argues that the legal system, the prison system and society in general discriminate against sex offenders and give them the status of “community (n-word) and outcast.”

County Attorney Ginbey, in resistance to Lindaman’s motions, says the sexual registry and special 10-year “parole” sentence are required by Iowa law and not up to the judge, and argues that the testimony of the witnesses Lindaman wants to call are irrelevant to the matter of sentencing.